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RIGHTS OF SURVIVING PARTY BEFORE FINAL DIVORCE
Divorce statutes in a majority of states' provide that specific wait-
ing periods, commencing with the entry of a divorce decree, must ex-
pire before the rights and privileges of an absolute divorce become
effective. The death of either party during the statutory waiting period
results in a situation uncertain as to the marital status and inheri-
tance rights of the surviving party.
In the recent case of Saunders v. Hanson,2 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia reviewed an estate proceeding wherein the
widow asserted a right to share, as widow, in the estate of her hus-
band. The widow had previously sought a divorce which was denied
her, but granted to the husband on the ground of desertion. The de-
cree for absolute divorce did not grant alimony or property rights
and was not appealed. The District of Columbia has a six month
waiting period before the divorce decree becomes effective.a Twelve
days before the expiration of this period the husband died.
Prior to the issuance of the divorce decree, the husband executed
a last will and testament in which he bequeathed to his putative wife
the sum of five dollars. The wife renounced the will and elected to
take payment of her intestate share as the decedent's widow. The
executor and daughter of the decedent, who opposed the renuncia-
tion and election of the putative widow, filed a complaint for a
declaratory judgment.
The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the
'Ala. Code tit. 34, § 38 (Recomp. 1958); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-320 (1956);
Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §§ 131, 132 (Deering 196o); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 46-1-9, lo
(1953); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1534 (1953); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-421 (1961); Hawaii
Rev. Laws § 324-31 (Supp. 1963); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 3-1224 (Repl. Vol. 1946); Kan.
Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-1512, 1514 (1949); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 208, §§ 21, 24 (Recomp.
1955);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.27 (1945); § 517.03 (Supp. 1963); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
§ 21-102 (1947); § 48-151 (Supp. 1963); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-340 (1960); N.J. Rev.
Stat. § 2A: 34-18, 19 (1952); Okla Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 128o, 1282 (1961); Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 107-110 (1963); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-5-23 (1956); S.D. Code §§
14.0701, 14.0707 (1939); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4640 (1948); Utah Code Ann. §§
30-3-6, 7, 8 (Supp. 1963);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 553, 559 (1958); W. Va. Code Ann. § 4722 (1961);
Wis. Stat. § 247.37 (1963). In three states, the waiting periods are discretionary.
Infra note 16.
2327 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
1D.C. Code Ann. § 16-421 (1g6i) states: "Every decree for absolute divorce shall
contain the date thereof and no such final decree shall be absolute and take effect
until the expiration of six months after its date."
CASE COMMENTS
widow.4 Since the divorce decree is merely provisional, the death of
the husband during the six month waiting period abated the action
for all purposes. The divorce decree, therefore, could not bar the
widow from sharing, as widow, in the estate of her dead husband.5
In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
below on the ground that the divorce decree is provisional and thus
ineffective for all purposes until the expiration of six months.6 While
concurring, Judge Burger stated that the application of the District
of Columbia statute was not intended to be as broad as the majority
stated.
7
A minority of jurisdictionss do not have statutory waiting periods.
A decree of divorce a vinculo matrimonii is an absolute divorce from
'In re Hanson, 210 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1962).
'The court relied on the decisions of Oliver v. Oliver, 185 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir.
195o); and Wesley v. Brown, 196 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1952). In the Oliver case, the
court interpreted § 16-421 of the D.C. Code as granting a provisional decree until
the expiration of six months. 185 F.2d at 431. The court, however, was interested
only in using the statute to declare void a subsequent marriage celebrated within
the six months period. In Wesley v. Brown, wherein the wife who obtained the di-
vorce was also the decedent, the court relied on its holding in the Oliver case.
OSupra note 2. The court relied on its decisions in Oliver v. Oliver, Wesley v.
Brown, supra note 5; and Dillard v. Dillard, 275 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 196o). In
the Dillard case, the court discussed the underlying policy of § 16-421 of the
D.C. Code. The statute "adopts and clearly expresses the broad policy of post-
poning for six months, and for all purposes, the effective date of any decree of
absolute divorce granted in the District of Columbia." 275 F.2d at 882.
7Judge Burger pointed to the court's consideration of the legislative history of
§ 16-421 of the D.C. Code in Oliver v. Oliver, supra note 5. "Other statements by
members of the [House] Committee clearly indicate that the provision was intended
as a barrier to hasty and fraudulent divorces." 185 F.2d at 432. See 79 Con. Rec.
11587 (1935). The District Court had previously held that marriage during the
six month waiting period was sufficiently dissolved for the wife to sue her hus-
band for assault. Steele v. Steele, 65 F. Supp. 329 (D.D.C. 1946). Under District
of Columbia law, the common law rule prevails that neither the husband nor the
wife is liable for tortious acts committed against the other during coverture. E.g.,
Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
Judge Burger concluded that the purpose of § 16-421 of the D.C. Code was to
prevent easy divorces and hasty remarriages of divorced persons. That purpose
was not served by allowing a divorced spouse to inherit as a surviving spouse. 327
F.2d at 891. It appears that Judge Burger ignored the remarks of Representative
Carpenter: "[A]nd in no event can the parties remarry until the lapse of six
months, because the decree does not become binding until 6 months after its date."
(Emphasis added.) (79 Cong. Rec. 11587 (1935).
"Ga. Code Ann. § 3o-o (Supp. 1963); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.010 (1963); Nev.
Rev. Stat § 125.130 (1957); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5o-11 (Supp. 1963); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-817 (1955); Va. Code Ann. § 20o-118 (Supp. 1964). Prior to 196o, § 20-118 of
the Virginia Code provided for a four month prohibition against remarriage. For
a discussion of the former provisions of § 20-118, see 15 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 327
(1958).
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the time the decree is entered.9 Unless otherwise provided by local
law, the decree terminates all obligations of either party to the other,
including the wife's dower right and the husband's right of curtesy.' 0
The divorce statutes of twenty-six states" provide for a diversity
of waiting periods.' 2 These statutes can be divided into two categories.
Firstly, there are the statutes which grant a single final decree of abso-
lute divorce, but with the possible limitation that one,13 or both part-
ies14 may not marry a third person for a specified time. Eleven statutes
in the first category provide for a mandatory waiting period.15 The
OBarrett v. Failing, ill U.S. 523-25 (1884); Biddle v. Biddle, 206 Ark. 623,
177 S.W.2d 32 (1944). The decree a vinculo matrimonii is a divorce from the
bond of matrimony. A decree a mensa et thoro is a divorce from bed and board.
"Barrett v. Failing, Biddle v. Biddle, supra note 9. The decree dissolves the
marriage and bars dower rights. E.g., O'Malley v. O'Malley, 46 Mont. 549, 129 Pac.
501 (1913).
"-Supra note 1.
-This diversity of statutory enactments among the states is possible because
every state has the constitutional power to control the domestic relations of its
domicilaries. But an ex parte decree of divorce rendered in one state may be
collaterally impeached in another state by proving that the court which granted
the decree did not have jurisdiction. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229
('945)-
'UInd. Ann. Stat. § 3-1224 (Repl. Vol. 1946); Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 25.122 (1957);
Miss. Code Ann. §§ 2744, 2745 (Recomp. 1942); S.D. Code §§ 14.0701, 14.0707( 1939).
The prohibition against remarriage is only applied to the party guilty of adultery
in Mississippi and South Dakota. In Michigan, only the party against whom the
divorce is granted is affected. In Indiana, the party who is granted the divorce
is prohibited from remarrying a third party for two years, when the divorce judg-
ment has been rendered without other notice than publication in a newspaper.
E.g., State ex rel. Seifret v. Branner, 174 Ind. 684, 92 N.E. 70 (1910).
"Ala. Code itt. 34, § 38 (Recomp. 1958); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-320 (1956);
Iowa Code Ann. § 598.17 (1946); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 6o-1512, 1514 (1919);
Minn. State Ann. § 518.27 (1945); § 517.03 (Supp. 1963); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
§ 21-102 (1947); § 47-151 (Supp. 1963); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 1280, 1282
(1961); Ore Rev. Stat. § 107.110 (1963); W. Va. Code Ann. § 4722 (1961). In Texas,
the prohibition period is only imposed when a divorce has been granted for cruel
treatment. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4640 (1948).
'5Ala. Code tit. 34, § 38 (Recomp. 1958); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-320 (1956);
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 3-1224 (Repl. Vol. 1946); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-1512, 1514
(1949); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 518.27 (1945) § 517-03 (Supp. 1963); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
12, §§ 1280, 1282 (1961); Ore Rev. Stat. § 107.110 (1963); S.D. §§ 14.0701, 14.0707
(1939); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4640 (1949); V. Va. Code Ann. § 4722 (1961).
The waiting period varies from sixty days in Alabama and West Virginia to
two years in Indiana. The Oklahoma statute was derived from the Kansas statute.
The language in both these statutes indicates that the divorce decree is not final
or absolute until the expiration of the statutory waiting period. In application,
however, both decrees operate as a final divorce decree that grants all the rights
and privileges of an absolute divorce, except the right to marry a third party
during the statutory waiting period. Durland v. Durland, 67 Kan. 734, 74 Pac.
274 (1903); Woods County v. Tucker, 312 P.-2d 452 (Okla. 1957).
CASE COMMENTS
statutes of Iowa, Michigan and Mississippi provide for waiting periods
that are subject to the discretion of the trial court.' 6
Secondly, there are the statutes which grant a decree of divorce,
but with the provision that the decree is ineffective to dissolve the
bonds of matrimony until the expiration of a specific waiting period.
17
The statutes in the second category can be sub-divided into two
groups: One group requires the entry of a final decree at the expiration
of the waiting period in order to terminate the marriage;' 8 and the
other group provides that the marital bonds are automatically severed,
without the necessity of another decree, upon the expiration of the
statutory waiting period.19
Under the first category of statutes, the divorce decree grants all
the rights and privileges of an absolute divorce with the exception
that the parties to the divorce suit may not marry a third person until
the expiration of the statutory waiting period.20 If either party dies
during the waiting period, the survivor is not entitled to share in the
estate of the deceased.21 Inheritance rights of the surviving party are
I'lowa Code Ann. § 598.17 (1946); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.122 (1957); Miss. Code
Ann. §§ 2744, 2745 (recomp. 1956).
The prohibition can be imposed for one year in Iowa and two years in Mich-
igan. In Mississippi no maximum time limit is set for the prohibition period which
can be imposed upon the party guilty of adultery. For good cause shown, how-
ever, the court which granted the divorce decree may remove the prohibition after
one year.
"Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §§ 131, 132 (Deering 196o); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
46-1-9, 10, (1953); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1534 (1953); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-421
(1961); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 324-31 (Supp. 1963); Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 208, §§ 21,
24 (Recomp. 1955); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-340 (196o); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A: 3 4 -18, 19
(1952); RI. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-5-23 (1956); Utah Code Ann. §§ 3o-3-6, 7, 8
(Supp. 1963); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 553, 559 (1958); Wis. Stat. § 247.37 (1963).
'Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §§ 131, 132 (Deering 196o); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1534
(1953); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A: 3 4 -18, 19 (1952); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-5--3 (1956);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 553, 559 (1958); Wis. Stat. § 247-37 (1963); Riddell v.
Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836 (9 th Cir. 196o).
"'Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 46-1-9, 10 (1953); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-421 (1961);
Hawaii Rev. Laws § 324-31 (Supp. 1963); Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 208, §§ 21, 24
(Recomp. 1955); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-340 (1960); Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-6, 7, 8
(Supp. 1963). Hoffer v. Hoffer, 120 Colo. 152, 207 P.2d 1203 (1949).
nHorton v. Horton, 22 Ariz. 490, 198 Pac. 1105, 1107 (1921); Durland v. Dur-
land, 67 Kan. 734, 74 Pac. 274 (1903); Deich v. Deich, 136 Mont. 566, 323 P.2d
35 (1958); Woods County v. Tucker, 312 P.2d 452 (Okla. 1957); Plummer v. Davis,
169 Okla. 374, 36 P.2d 938 (1934). The West Virginia statute is typical: "When
a divorce is decreed neither party to the marriage so dissolved shall in any case
again marry within sixty days from the date of the decree...." (Emphasis added.)
WV. Va. Code Ann. § 4722 (1961).
"Dillard v. Dillard, 275 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 196o); Schurink v. United States,
177 F.2id 8o9 (5th Cir. 1949); Fletcher v. Monroe, 145 Ind. 56, 43 N.E. 1053 (1896);
Durland v. Durland, 67 Kan. 734, 74 Pac. 274 (19o3); Woods County v. Tucker, 312
19651
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limited to any settlement granted in the decree itself, with a possibili-
ty of property bequeathed by will.22
Under the second category of statutes, the divorce decree is pro-
visional, and the rights and privileges of an absolute divorce are not ef-
fective until the expiration of the statutory waiting period. Six of
these statutes utilize the true interlocutory system. 23 The initial in-
terlocutory divorce decree is merely a judicial declaration that a party
is entitled to a divorce at a later date. The divorce is thus conditional
until the expiration of the statutory waiting period, and the bonds of
matrimony are not severed until the final decree is entered.24
The remaining statutes in the second category provide for a single
decree of divorce which is provisional, but becomes final and effective
at the expiration of the statutory waiting period without requiring
any action by the court.2 5 The bonds of matrimony are not severed
until the decree becomes effective.2 6
Under all the second category statutes, the death of either spouse
during the statutory waiting period abates any divorce action that is
concerned solely with the personal status of the parties. 27 As a result,
P.2d 452 (Okla. 1957). A foreign marriage, however, raises a conflict of laws prob-
lem. Several jurisdictions hold that the prohibitional period has no extraterri-
torial effect. Sanders v. Sanders, 147 Cal. App. 2d 450, 305 P.2d 655 (Dist. Ct. 1957);
Bauer v. Abrahams, 73 Co1o. 509, 216 Pac. 259 (1923); Pickard v. Pickard, 241 Iowa
1307, 45 N.W.2d 269 (195o); But see, Wilson v. Cook, 256 Ill. 460, 1oo N.E. 222 (1912).
The Montana statute provides that any Montana resident party to a local or foreign
divorce cannot remarry for six months after the decree. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §
48-151 (Supp. 1963).
2Some jurisdictions, however, provide for statutory revocation of the di-
vorced spouse's interest under the testator's will when the testator fails to revoke
the will before his death. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 6-508 (Repl. Vol. 1946); Kan. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 59-61o (1949); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 525.191 (1945); Model Probate Code §
53 (Simes 1946).
"See statutes, supra note 18. The initial decree is called interlocutory in Cal-
ifornia; and a decree nisi in Delaware, New Jersey and Vermont.
24In re Seller's Estate, 164 Cal. 181, 128 Pac. 334 (1912); Vinyard v. Vinyard, 43
Del. 422, 48 A.2d 497 (Super. Ct. 1946); Dacunzo v. Edgye, 19 N.J. 443, 117 A.2d 5o8
(1955); Hoffland v. Liesenfeld, 196 Wis. 7, 219 N.W. 273 (1928).
nSupra note 19. Copple v. Bowlin, 172 Neb. 467, 11o N.W.2d 117 (1961).
4Saunders v. Hanson, supra note 2. Oliver v. Oliver, supra note 5. In the
matter of Parker, 177 Neb. 197, 128 N.W.2d 696 (1964); In re Harper's Estate, s Utah
2d 296, 265 P.2d 1005 (1954). Hawaii apparently does not have any reported cases
on this subject.
"Saunders v. Hanson, supra note 2. In re Seiler's Estate, supra note 24. In the
matter of Parker and In re Harper's Estate, supra note 26. Death, however, does not
expunge the divorce action from the records. Morris v. Propst, 98 Colo. 213, 55 P.2d
944 (1936). Nor does death abate the divorce action when a final decree has been
signed, but not entered by the clerk. Matthews v. Matthews, 185 Misc. 13, 58
N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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the surviving wife is considered the widow of the deceased husband,
and the surviving husband is considered the widower of the deceased
wife.28 The reasoning assigned to this rule is that the death of either
spouse terminates the divorce action because of its personal nature,
and because the marriage is automatically dissolved by death.29 The
Wisconsin divorce statute is an exception to this rule. The statute pro-
vides that the bonds of matrimony exist for the one year waiting peri-
od. If, however, either party dies within the one year period, the mar-
riage relation is completely severed "immediately before such death."
30
When the divorce decree under the second category of statutes is
concerned with the personal status and the property rights of the
parties, there is some conflict among the states as to whether the death
of either party before the expiration of the statutory waiting period
completely abates the action. In some jurisdictions, the provisional
decree may become a final decree as to the property rights involved,
notwithstanding the death of either party to the action.31 In other
jurisdictions, the death of either party abates the action and nullifies
the provisional decree in its entirety.
32
In the principal case, the court was concerned with a provisional
divorce decree that did not grant alimony or property rights. The
court's decision, that the death of the husband during the six months
waiting period abated the divorce action, is in accord with the cases
which have construed a statute similar to that of the District of
Columbia. Judge Burger's interpretation of the statute in his concur-
ring opinion, indicates that Congress intended to pass a first category
type statute which only imposes a limitation on hasty remarriage.3 3
2E.g., Diggs v. Diggs, 291 Mass. 399, 196 N.E. 858 (1935); and In re Waller's
Estate, 116 Neb. 352, 217 N.W. 588 (1928).
2 McPherson v. McPherson, 200 Wash. 365, 93 P.2d 428 (1939)-
'Wis. Stat. 247.37 (1963). (Emphasis added.) E.g., Hirchert v. Hirchert, 243
Wis. 519, 11 N.W.2d 157 (1943).
-Darter v. Magnussen, 172 Cal. App. 2d 714, 342 P.2d 528 (Dist. Ct. 1959); Holm-
berg v. Holmberg, 1o6 Neb. 717, 184 N.W. 134 (1921); In re Harper's Estate, supra
note a.6.
2Chase v. Webster, 168 Mass 228, 46 N.E. 705 (1897). In the Matter of Parker,
supra note 26. Under this rule, the living party is entitled to the property rights
springing by operation of the law from the marital relation, when death dis-
solves the marriage before the expiration of the statutory waiting period. The
surviving party, however, may be precluded from these rights, when he is bound
by contract, waiver or estoppel, that fixes those rights within the provisional decree
of divorce. E.g., Gould v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 197, 191 Pac. 56 (Dist. Ct.
1920).
3Supra note 7. "[The purpose of the statute is fully effectuated when it
prevents remarriage within six months after the decree; it should have no other
consequence." 327 F.2d at 891. Judge Burger went on to say: "As I see it, the coi-
19651
